VENEZUELA: Direct Democracy - The Case of the Consejos Comunales

Venezuelan Direct Democracy – The case of the Consejos Comunales

November 21st 2008, by Michael Albert and Adam Gill - ZNet
Source: http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/3967

In 2004, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez created a movement named the consejos comunales (communal councils) aimed at creating more responsive local governance by handing local budgetary and legislative power to the councils. This movement was seen by Chavez as one of the most important of the five motors of the ‘Bolivarian Revolution' in that they should influence policy from the grassroots upwards. Great interest in the councils was evident between 2004 and 2007 in that thousands formed quickly and $5 Billion was given to them during this period. Communal banks are a pre-requisite to receiving funds from the government so as to avoid clientalistic relationships of dependency.

Local councils have the power to vote on issues directly affecting their community and have used this to make significant changes. Major improvements have included building social housing and repairing roads. The local councils are formed with 200-400 families with members aged 15 and above and have an executive council and representatives of groups within the community.

I asked Michael Albert if he might be able to offer his opinion on this movement in Venezuela.

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What do you feel the role of the Communal Councils is strategically and politically?

Well, I believe they are partly intended, in the present, to push forward the whole revolutionary process by increasing current participation, raising consciousness, etc.

But I also believe that for a great many folks in Venezuela, both inside and outside the government, the councils are the evolving infrastructure of a new polity. The idea is that people should govern their own lives, and in that context local councils are the proposed vehicle for doing it. As such, they are intended to become an alternative to rather than just being an adjunct to local governments of mayors and governors and the like.

Would you say the councils have created social change or more that their energies are being pulled in other directions?

I don't feel very equipped to answer this question, and I am not entirely sure, in any case, what you mean by "other directions." I can judge only from a very great difference and based on talks with only a limited number of people what the councils are up to.

My impression, and it is tentative, is that the councils are a vast and evolving experiment and project, by no means final in form and by no means fully up to speed, but coming along, though many problems still exist. First, for example, there is a population which - like our population in the U.S - has almost zero experience prior to this experiment with serious democracy much less participatory self management. So the councils and their members are learning in practice, and for many people that has ups and downs. But second, and less benign, there are obstacles as well having to do not only with past habits or current doubts, but also with real opposition, as in local governing and corporate elites not wanting this experiment to work.

Venezuela seems to me to be uniquely seeking a gigantic revolution in structures and relations - not just economically but also politically, socially, culturally - all non violently and even without much confrontation, none provoked by the agents of change. That is historically ambitious, to say the least.

So in one corner you have corporate media continuing, and corporate ownership in many realms, and governors and mayors and whatnot from the prior history of the country, all also still in place, nearly all still hoping to resurrect that prior history. In the other corner you have the Bolivarian activists, and Chavez, and a large proportion of the non elite population, instead trying to escape that past into something fundamentally new.

Venezuala is, in other words, a daily economic, political, social, and cultural cauldron of experiment and opposition - and thus a site of intense struggle. Or that is how I see Venezuela, at any rate, and in that context the local communal councils are partly a tool of the struggle but are also partly seeds of a new future being built in the present.

Should Communal Councils be free of political party influence?

This depends, I think, on what you mean by party influence. So, for example, it wouldn't make sense to say there should be no party influence. Imagine a council with people in it, of course. Some people are in one party, some people are in another party. The parties they are in influence those people's desires (and vice versa). The people then bring their desires to the councils, so through their members the parties influence the councils as well. That much is fine, in my view. It would make no sense to say that shouldn't occur.

So, for example, there are councils in communities that are very Bolivarian, and they have views and aims quite like those of the Bolivarian revolution. There are other councils in communities that are opposed to Bolivarian projects, and those councils reflect those opposition views. The parties are in part carriers of the views and the people form parties, in turn, influence the councils.

On the other hand, I think you might mean should parties as entities be able to themselves direct or otherwise impact councils, other than by the fact of their members indirectly doing so. Here I think the answer is no, they should not be able to do that.

Your question is a bit like asking, in the U.S., should local government (just imagine, for the sake of the discussion, that it was actually grassroots and participatory) be in any way at all subject to instruction or control by political parties (other than being impacted by the local members of the community who happen to be in parties)? Well, of course it shouldn't, and ditto for Venezuela. A party should impact councils simply by impacting the population that composes the councils, but not by some sort of collective or structural authority.

Do you think that party influence and political movements still operate as clients of central governments?

I am not sure I understand this question. In Venezuela, at present, the Bolivarian revolution is very much a manifestation of the ideas and will of President Chavez. We might prefer that the movement had bubbled up, instead, from the population, and that Chavez was merely one among many carriers of their intentions - but that isn't the case. In fact, Chavez is constantly trying to impact what the population thinks and wants, not just to hear from it. The government is not only administering Venezuela, as it is seeking to use state power as a tool to build social involvement and activism. It is very unusual, of course.

So in that context, the recently created revolutionary party Chavez is in is certainly affected greatly by him, as are the social movements whose members typically consider him a repository of valuable ideas and plans, as is the government. Again, this is arguably not an optimal picture, and it is certainly an unusual one - a president seeking to build movements that will replace authorities, including the old government structures, including himself - at least that's the current agenda - throughout the country - but that is what is happening, or so it seems to me, from my admittedly limited contact.

Can the Communal Councils in your opinion, become the only form of local government in Venezuela? What obstacles do you perceive to be happening now and possibly in the future?

I certainly think that is possible, and that that is the goal, not just conceivable, at least in many people's minds, including in the relevant political ministries. I sat in offices and heard them explain their hopes for these councils becoming the seat of governing power throughout the country, describing the 50,000 councils that were needed - with about 30,000 currently formed - and describing the gains in confidence and methods also needed within the councils, and explaining that yes, these would be above majors and governors and even the President. So, yes, having them be the primary locus of government power is the aim. Might that aim be swept aside as a goal? Sure, it might. But it also might come true as a reality.

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VENEZUELA: The Struggle Continues

The following article dicusses some of the stumbling blocks in the process of bringing participatory democracy to Venezuela, while recognizing that the country is slowly advancing the transition of power and control of resources to the people. - Editor








Sounds of Venezuela: Part 8
Grass Roots Democracy

by Ron Ridenour / October 25th, 2008
Source: http://www.dissidentvoice.org/2008/10/sounds-of-venezuela-part-8/

Participatory democracy: people actively organizing in the communities and attending meetings where local issues are discussed and solutions are proposed and voted on—is a major element of the Bolivarian Revolution. By August 2007, 2.2 million citizens were organized in 25,000 community councils (CC). In February 2008, community councils, their elected spokespersons and municipal officials and advisors engaged in lively meetings to evaluate progress and lay a course for the future. These meetings were followed by gatherings of two of the three largest and most important political parties backing this process: the new PSUV and Venezuela’s oldest, the Communist Party (PCV). I attended some of these events.

In Las Mercedes district, where I lived, nearly 100 members of five CCs gathered at a local hall. A large majority were women, mostly 40 years old and over. They met to consolidate their social organizing and take a position on a structural change proposal. Direct participation had allowed each CC to take individual directions but this was leading to a bit of chaos: differences in how to use resources, what programs took priority, which CC should house the local bank that distributes the funds allocated for community councils. Most of these funds come from the federal government, some from municipalities. These authorities were proposing that the structure be changed to accommodate a bit of centralization and control, which could lead to greater effectiveness.

I was surprised and impressed with how people openly complained about the failure of the municipal government to disseminate adequate information and provide basic training for community leadership and organizers, and about how people’s admiration for Chavez did not hinder several in objecting to the new proposal. A few rose in opposition to the mancomunidades proposal, which would bring several CCs inside an umbrella body that would work with authorities from “above” the individual CCs, as some viewed this.

“There is nothing in the law under which community councils operate that mandates such a direction,” said one opponent. “On the contrary, it speaks of direct power, and resources going directly to each council. Some of the municipal advisors are saying things here that is not the law, nor what Chavez has said.”

Another man spoke sharply from the podium:

“We lack training. We lack information from our local leaders. Some do not know how to manage administratively, either our projects or the moneys allocated. Too many of us are still driven by egoism. We have to learn how to motivate our councils, the spokespersons and our neighbors.”

The issue of where the bank administering CC funds should be located led to a hefty debate. The majority wished to move it from the CC where it was, because that council was not active and there was suspicion that the funds were not well utilized. Representatives from one council said the money they should have received was not forthcoming.

Solutions to these matters would be decided upon at another round of meetings and after street debate.

That evening I attended a local PSUV meeting. The main topic was the current round of CC meetings and the issue of mancomunidades. The general attitude among these one dozen members, mostly over 45 years old, was that “a small group tried to sabotage the assembly”, as the chairman characterized the protest. Not all were caught up in heavy-handed terminology and limited condemnations, and some saw the need to struggle internally to solve significant problems not being addressed by their local government. Among those was the lack of caring and adequate medical treatment at the hospital, which was raised by a retired doctor who volunteers at the local hospital.

After the meeting, five of us went to a café to imbibe in national brews. They asked my opinion on a variety of issues, and what did I see as the number one problem within the revolutionary process. I hesitated to render conclusions after such a short time observing, but they insisted. My spontaneous answer was: the lack of follow through.

Everyone agreed. Example after example plopped onto the wobbly table. I presented one and asked their opinion about the cause. I recalled what a young taxi driver had told me. As a supporter of the Chavez government, Gabriel had applied to take a Francisco Miranda course in Cuba. The idea behind this mission is to create a civilian cadre, which would form a military reserve for defense. The volunteers were often sent to Cuba to acquire a political understanding of revolution and some discipline. So far about 3000 had participated. My driver told me that when he returned from three months “enjoying the generous hospitality of Cubans, not the least the women”, there was nothing to incorporate into, there was no follow up at home. What little he considered he had learned in the brother nation he had forgotten with disuse. Gabriel was so disgruntled he said he would not vote for Rosa León again, albeit mayors have nothing to do with this mission.

Yes, that was all too familiar, the PSUV activists replied. “Lack of infrastructure; most people look after self-interests; some generals don’t want an independent militia; too much talk-not enough action.”

I encountered the same problem with the voceros. At the weekly meeting for all spokespersons of the more than 100 CCs, 17 showed up. They spoke about problems in advancing some projects, about too many activists meeting late or abstaining, problems balancing family, a job and volunteer work. One of the agenda items was an invitation for me to hold a lecture-seminar about communication, how to better reach people in the neighborhoods.

Many spoke enthusiastically about the need for learning. I could also offer advice about a newsletter soon to be launched. Agreement was reached on a day session with lunch and a date set. I prepared for this important initiative. I heard nothing in the week to come. The day before the event, I phoned the municipality’s paid coordinator of the voceros. Oh, he said evenly, no one arranged anything. He did not understand my disappointment and dismay of the frivolous manner of unfulfilling decisions.

Why is making a revolution so difficult?

Ah, imagine your neighbor Sarah. She gets her news from the national and international corporate media. She does what pleases her. If she doesn’t see the fun in doing something she doesn’t do anything. Yeah, we know a lot like her. It might even ring a bell inside. So, what does it take to have Sarah change into a person who wants to cooperate with many others, taking her time, using her energy to create something new, something great for everybody, if everybody works at it? Just what are the tools we need—mental and spiritual as well as physical and emotional ones—and how do we develop them? That is not so easy to conceive let alone practice and transform society in a few years, right?

Already, through the energy generated by the mass behind the committed leadership, wonders have been created. Alongside those I’ve portrayed earlier in these writings, is an essential and historical one. Vicente Vallenilla, the Venezuelan ambassador to Denmark, told me before I departed for his homeland:

“We say that what is happening now is real sovereignty, and for the first time in our history. We are taking our natural resources into our own hands. We are transforming from the sole objective of profit-making for a few to greater distribution of the wealth, commonly created, replacing the raw materialism of today with a more spiritual life tomorrow, one of sovereignty and independence, of wholeness in fellowship and, thus, happiness.”

VENEZUELA: Fact Check - Human Rights Abuse Claims are False

Contrary to the recent report issued by Human Rights Watch in an apparent attempt to promulgate and disseminate a view of Venezuela that is purposely false and misleading in order to feed the fires of anti-Chavez sentiment and portray him as an authoritarian dictator, participatory democracy is thriving in Venezuela and human rights have improved since Chavez was first elected. While of course human rights abuses do occur in Venezuela today, they do not emanate from and are not sanctioned by the government of Hugo Chavez. They can generally be attributed to one of two sources:

• Those perpetrated by local police and security forces geographically removed from the center of government in Caracas. These are not politically motivated abuses, and are an unfortunate leftover from the patterns of behavior generated in pre-Chavez years when security forces were trained by the U.S. intelligence services in the methods of brutality and summary justice. These abuses have been on the wane because of efforts of the Chavez government to stop them and bring the perpetrators to justice, and of course the termination of training programs provided by or influenced by U.S. intelligence operations.

• Those perpetrated by members of the opposition inciting violence in an attempt to destabilize the country and disrupt the democratic process. These include politically motivated killings by security forces aligned with the opposition.

Although the U.S. State Department 2007 report on human rights in Venezuela also contains mostly inaccuracies and misleading statements similar to those in the HRW report, the assertions this editor has made here are substantiated by this most unlikely of sources. The U.S. State Department report states:

• "There were no reports that the government or its agents committed any politically motivated killings; however, security forces committed unlawful killings, including summary executions of criminal suspects. In the 12 months prior to September, the human rights nongovernmental organization (NGO) Venezuelan Program of Action and Education in Human Rights (PROVEA) reported 51 deaths resulting from mistreatment while in custody."

• "There were no substantiated reports of politically motivated disappearances."

The State Department report also makes many politically motivated false assertions about government and justice department inaction regarding human rights abuses, assertions which are generated by 'human rights organizations' in Venezuela that are strongly within the opposition camp and closely aligned with U.S. foreign policy objectives in Venezuela. The report also claims that Venezuela has 11 political prisoners, but fails to mention that nine of those cited are Caracas metropolitan police officers who in support of the 2002 coup attempt against Chavez shot civilians in Caracas. The other two cited were a retired army general who was sentenced to five years and released after three years for false statements he made to the press claiming that the army had torched eight of its own soldiers with a flamethrower in a fire that occurred in a military fort, and a former governor imprisoned on corruption charges who escaped and was recaptured. Nevertheless, the basic fact that politically motivated abuses by the government are NOT occurring is substantiated in the report because there simply is no evidence to the contrary. To read the entire State Department report, CLICK HERE.

Shame on Human Rights Watch for taking part in this misinformation campaign against a democratically elected government in Venezuela that is bringing participatory democracy and equality to a nation that has traditionally known only injustice, exploitation, and oligarchical rule. See our previous posts on Venezuela to learn more about participatory democracy in that country. - Editor


Venezuela: Human Rights Watch versus democracy

The US-based NGO Human Rights Watch has issued a new report on Venezuela. The report blatantly distorts the truth in order to promote the regime-change agenda of the United States administration.

Source: http://21stcenturysocialism.com/article/venezuela_human_rights_watch_versus_democracy_01734.htmll

On Sept 18th 2008, Human Rights Watch (HRW) released a report entitled 'Venezuela: Rights Suffer Under Chavez'. The report has been characterised by the Venezuelan government as biased and inaccurate.

The HRW report comes in the wake of an intensification of attacks on Venezuela by various branches of the US administration. These include:

• the re-establishment of the Fourth Fleet – previously decommissioned in 1952, the Fourth Fleet is reportedly made up of 25 warships, deployed around South America; and about which, several Latin American countries, Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela, amongst them, have expressed deep concerns;

• John Walters, the US drug Czar, has accused Venezuela of inaction in the war on drugs;

• the US State Department recently discussed the possibility of adding Venezuela to the list of nations that sponsor terrorism;

• the allegation that the Venezuelan government was behind the suitcase stuffed with US$800,000 brought into Argentina by Venezuelan-American citizen, Antonini Wilson, but, which, in reality, was denounced by Chavez and Argentine President Cristina Fernandez, as a dirty operation, about which nothing has been conclusively demonstrated, but which has become the focus of intense media attention. Despite repeated requests by both Argentina and Venezuela, US authorities have refused to extradite Antonini to face questions;

• sanctions by the US Treasury of several Venezuelan officials over unproven allegations that they aided the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) of Colombia.

Most recently, following the expulsion of the US Ambassador from Bolivia over his relations with right wing extremists, Venezuela expelled its US Ambassador in solidarity, and the US responded by expelling the Venezuelan Ambassador from the USA.

On 10th September 2008, a plot to assassinate President Chavez and carry out a military coup was exposed. The plot was led by high level retired and serving military officers.

This is the context, one of of acute tensions between Venezuela and the US, for the publication on 18th September of the Human Rights Watch report on Venezuela. Its key theme, as outlined by José Miguel Vivanco, Americas director at HRW, is as follows:

“Ten years ago, Chávez promoted a new constitution that could have significantly improved human rights in Venezuela. But rather than advancing rights protections, his government has since moved in the opposite direction, sacrificing basic guarantees in pursuit of its own political agenda.”
The 230-page Report makes the charge that “Discrimination on political grounds has been a defining feature of the Chavez presidency.” Although Venezuela under President Chavez is by no means perfect, it bears no relation to the country depicted in HRW’s 2008 Report.

The key allegation, that discrimination on political grounds has been a defining feature of the Chavez presidency, looks absurd when it is understood that the civil service remains largely full of supporters of the old regime, some of whom have allegedly engaged in criminal actions, such as the destruction of key operational facilities of the national oil company PDVSA during the oil lock-out that brought the country’s economy to near collapse.

The lock-out took place almost immediately after the short-lived overthrow of President Chavez in a military coup in April 2002. The coup was backed by the military high command, the main private media, the national employers’ organisation and the old discredited trade union federation CTV.

Following the coup, there was a campaign to oust Chavez through a recall referendum in 2004. When that failed, the opposition boycotted the 2005 parliamentary election in order to try to question the legitimacy of the government. Throughout these tense events, opposition politicians and private media talked openly of violently overthrowing the government and adopted an intensely confrontational attitude.

The recently revealed plot for another coup attempt and plans to assassinate President Chavez, just before regional and local elections in November, are in line with the stance taken by the opposition at crucial moments.

Expanding democracy

Contrary to HRW’s allegations that the Venezuelan government practices ‘political discrimination’ against the opposition, the government’s attitude to the opposition’s persistent efforts to use violent and unconstitutional means to overthrow it, has been one of tolerance and magnanimity. Last year, President Chávez pardoned political opponents who backed the failed 2002 coup against his democratically-elected government. “It’s a matter of turning the page,” Chávez said. "We want there to be a strong ideological and political debate - but in peace.”

In this spirit, the government has often welcomed input from the opposition, for example, inviting the leaders of student protests to address the National Assembly. Not a common occurrence anywhere else in the world.

All political parties in Venezuela operate without any constraints. The majority of these parties are in the opposition; their difficulty is that they do not enjoy the high levels of support of the fewer pro-government political parties.

Opposition parties in Venezuela can and do organise public meetings, rallies, demonstrations, street marches; their spokespersons speak regularly on TV and radio – and they never moderate their language, their criticism, or their opposition to the government. They stand candidates for elections, hold national party events, issue proclamations, statements, hold press conferences, publish books, pamphlets, disseminate anti-government propaganda – in the streets and through the media, without any governmental sanctions whatsoever.

The great majority of private newspapers and television stations in the country support the Opposition and they face no restrictions other than the normal ones that exist in any democratic country, such as those governing libel and defamation. No Venezuelan newspaper has ever been subjected to any censorship by the Chavez administration. There are no political prisoners of any kind in Venezuela.

With regard to the judiciary, contrary to the 2008 HRW report’s contention, under Chavez the independence and probity of the judiciary has been significantly strengthened by dealing with the corruption with which it was previously riddled. HRW’s own 2004 report recognized this:

“When President Chávez became president in 1999, he inherited a judiciary that had been plagued for years by influence-peddling, political interference, and, above all, corruption...In terms of public credibility, the system was bankrupt.”

At the same time, all democratic institutions have been strengthened in Venezuela, exemplified by the internationally verified efficiency and scrupulous fairness of the National Electoral Council, which has had no hesitation in upholding electoral results unfavourable to the government such as the defeat of the 2007 constitutional referendum – a result accepted immediately by President Chavez and his government.

HRW’s assertion that the Venezuelan media balance is shifting in favour of Chavez is misleading. In fact, the opposition media enjoy unrestricted freedom but they are increasingly seen as grossly biased and as having lost the political argument. The reality remains that the private media, which largely supports the opposition, controls the largest share of the airwaves, and there are no major pro-government national daily newspapers.

HRW’s allegation that the government “has sought to remake the country’s labor movement in ways that violate basic principles of freedom of association,” also bears no relation to reality.

There are six national trade union federations in Venezuela (CTV, CUTV, UNT, CODESA, CGT, and CST), all of which function with total freedom and without the kind of draconian anti-trade union legislation which disfigures the USA and many of its allies.

Industrial relations are evolving positively. Furthermore, the level of trade union membership is rising – before Chávez came to office in 1999, 11% of workers were in unions; the figure now is estimated to be over 20%. Thus, HRW’s allegation that the government violates basic principles of union association is not borne out by the facts.

The charge of the HRW 2008 report that the Chávez government has an “aggressively adversarial approach to local rights advocates and civil society organizations” is equally false. With varying degrees of success, the government has been empowering millions of hitherto excluded people through an array of social organizations, such as – tens of thousands of - communal councils, which aim to democratize local government.

There are also 200,000 cooperatives, women’s organizations, indigenous organizations, Afro-descendants organizations, organizations of gays and lesbians, and so forth. The numbers of these organizations have mushroomed because their rights have, for the first time ever, been either enshrined in the 1999 constitution or are being actively promoted and the government has been keen to assist them.

Additionally, as part of the implementation of the principles of participatory democracy enshrined in the 1999 Constitution, the government has made successful efforts to enfranchise ever larger layers of the traditionally excluded.

In terms of the traditional electoral process, the number of registered voters has increased phenomenonally. When Chávez was first elected President in 1998 the number of registered voters was 11,013,020. This has increased to 16,109,664 (a staggering 60% increase) by the time of the 2007 Constitutional Referendum.

At the same time, Venezuela has held more internationally recognized democratic elections than virtually any other country in the world in the decade Chávez has been in office.

To argue, as does the HRW, that this situation corresponds in any way to stifling civil society is to deny reality.

US-funded opposition

The government, however, has had serious concerns about illegal activity by a relatively small number of NGO-type bodies funded by the USA, which engage in campaigns to subvert the constitutional order. The US funded SUMATE ‘NGO’, for example, centralized the collection of signatures to unseat Chavez in 2004, and its leader, Corina Machado, endorsed the 2002 coup.

The publicly acknowledged funding of such so-called NGOs comes from US government sources including the infamous National Endowment for Democracy, USAID, the International Republican Institute (IRI), the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, the American Centre for International Labour Solidarity and the Centre for International Private Enterprise. The government of Venezuela charges that these organisations are channels for the covert funding of opposition groups to seek to undermine democratic institutions and the elected government.

This charge is amply confirmed by international experience. One example illustrates this. On hearing of the ousting of Chávez in April 2002, International Republican Institute President, George A. Folsom, issued the following statement:

“Last night, led by every sector of civil society, the Venezuelan people rose up to defend democracy in their country. Venezuelans were provoked into action as a result of systematic repression by the Government of Hugo Chavez. Several hundred thousand people filled the streets of Caracas to demand the resignation of Lt. Col. Chavez.”

The chairman of the IRI since 1993 has been the current Republican presidential candidate John McCain, who has made no bones about his intense antagonism to progressive governments in Latin America, especially, Chavez. His campaign website even featured an online petition calling for support in his quest to “stop the dictators of Latin America.” The petition called for the removal of Chávez “in the name of democracy and freedom throughout our hemisphere.” Although the petition was taken down, it is an indication of his thinking, as leader of this NGO funder and a possible future president of the USA.

In a similar vein, several months after the failed 2002 coup, the US State Dept established an Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) in Caracas, with money from USAID and which operates out of the US Embassy with, among other stated objectives: “to provide fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key transition needs.” ‘Transition’ has to be seen in the context of the US administration’s doctrine of its right to seek to externally promote ‘regime change’ in countries which it perceives as pursuing policies against the interests of the sections of the US it represents.

The Chávez government has been expanding democracy and social progress to unprecedented levels. And in truth, there is no serious evidence of any systematic effort or policy aimed at attacking human rights; in fact, all evidence points in the opposite direction. Therefore, it is difficult not to conclude that HRW’s 2008 report, as on previous occasions, does not have the purpose of constructive criticism of shortcomings or possible flaws in the process of social progress and democratization underway in Venezuela – which would be welcome – but that it distorts reality to depict a country on the verge of becoming a nasty dictatorship.

The imbalance in the HRW report is evident in that, for example, it does not even mention the substantial progress that has been made in improving the human rights of the immense majority of the population by such means as:

• the reduction of poverty (by 34%);

• the eradication of illiteracy;

• the expansion of education from 6 million people participating in education in 1998 to more than 12 million in 2008;

• the access to free health care increased to the great majority of the population, about 20 million people, by 2008;

• the provision of subsidized food benefiting 12-14 million people in 2008;

• the reduction in unemployment to historic low levels of around 7% in
2008;

• the promotion of a far greater role of women in society and the economy; and

• the dramatic increase in social spending that has taken place in Venezuela since the election of Chavez.

The unbalanced and plain misleading character of HRW’s reports on Venezuela has been consistent and has coincided uncannily with the run-up to important electoral contests such as the forthcoming November elections this year. It issued a communiqué on Venezuela with similar unsubstantiated themes in June 2004, just two months before the recall referendum against Chavez. In October 2007, it published a statement expressing similar preoccupations just two months before the constitutional referendum. And HRW published its 2008 report on 18th September, just two months away from regional and local authority elections in Venezuela in November 2008.

All these reports have echoed US anti-Chavez propaganda: ‘a dictatorship is in the making in Venezuela’. Back in June, John McCain said in a speech to the Florida Association of Broadcasters: “Hugo Chavez has used the cloak of electoral legitimacy to establish a one party dictatorship in Venezuela.”

The question presents itself: who stands to gain from Human Rights Watch activity in Venezuela – the population of the country or the Washington administration seeking to undermine an elected government seen as breaking free of its traditional economic and political domination?

Dr Francisco Domínguez is head of the Centre for Brazilian and Latin American Studies at Middlesex University, UK.

VENEZUELA: INTERVIEW - Participatory Democracy and the PSUV

Venezuela's Bolivarian Process, Democracy, and Socialism: A View from the PSUV in Mérida

by Jeffery R. Webber

Source: http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/webber060908.html

Canadian socialist Jeffery R. Webber interviewed Oscar González, Coordinator of Organization of Social Movements for Popular Power in the Mérida branch of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) – Mérida, Venezuela, September 5, 2008.

JRW: First, can we start off with your name and position in this organization?

OG: My name is Oscar González. I'm the Coordinator of Organization of Social Movements for Popular Power, within the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). I am also the publicity representative, for one of the socialist battalions of the grassroots of the PSUV in Mérida.

JRW: How did you become a political activist in this organization?

OG: I responded to the call of our comandante Hugo Chávez Frías, in April 2006. We began to form, from the grassroots, a new party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela. Various activists began to organize the people in communities, organized meetings, essentially founding the grassroots of the socialist party. This base can be found in the socialist battalions. Each poor neighbourhood (parroquia) has a number of them. The socialist battalions have on average 300 members who meet every week. They elect a spokesperson, a committee person for policy, a committee person for propaganda, for territorial defense. These are the grassroots, the basic cells, of the PSUV.

JRW: Can you describe the trajectory of the Bolivarian process in general terms since 1998? How has the process radicalized over the years?

OG: This process did not begin in 1998. It began with the Caracazo on February 27, 1989, when the people took to the streets in reaction to the policies imposed by the former President Carlos Andrés Pérez. And then there was barbarous military repression on the part of that government of the fourth republic.1

In this context, comandante Chávez founded the Movimiento Bolivariano 200, which made an oath [inaudible]. . . . Next, the coup of February 4, 1992 took place, led by Hugo Chávez Frías. He tried to take power, precisely to return it to the people.

All of this led to him going to jail. The coup failed. However, the people began to see hope. And this hope materialized in 1998 when Chávez won the elections, and arrived in the presidency.

After this moment, there was a radicalization of confrontation. Not on the part of the sectors that supported President Chávez, but rather on the part of wealthy sectors, people who have economic power, and who felt this diminishing in the sense that this government has tried to give power to the poor.2 But Chávez didn't cause this, it's a question of the class struggle. As you know, this is the eternal struggle that we have to confront.

JRW: What have been the most important successes of these years from your perspective?

OG: The most important successes of the revolutionary government of President Chávez have been the missions.3 The education missions have achieved almost 100 percent literacy in the national territory. They have achieved the inclusion of people who were totally excluded from middle and higher level education, with the Mission Río and the Mission Sucre. They have brought medicine to the barrios, the poor sectors, with the Mission Barrio Adentro. They have solved grave problems with the Mission Milagro, operations for people who couldn't see. They have implemented operation [inaudible], for the people living in the streets.

I think that the missions, with all that they lack and all their errors, have been the leading force of the Bolivarian government of Chávez.

JRW: At this conjuncture, what are the most important weaknesses that must be overcome?

OG: I think that the weaknesses are internal. We live in a capitalist society. We're capitalists. From when we're very young they plant a capitalist chip in our heads. For example, when you buy a sweater for your kid, you don't say, "take this sweater, it's for when you are cold," you say, "take this sweater, it's yours," and you plant the chip. So this makes it very difficult to introduce socialism overnight, or to assimilate ourselves to socialism. Proof of this was that we lost the reform [the referendum on reforming the Constitution in December 2007]. The reforms signified the start of socialism in Venezuelan territory.4

So, I think that the principal weakness is ideological. I think that we have to strengthen ourselves in this sense, so that the people really understand what socialism is and the benefits it brings.

That it doesn't mean that your kids will be taken away, or that your house will be taken away [in reference to the scare tactics of the right-wing opposition in Venezuela]. This government is the only government that has given property titles to those [impoverished] people who were living on municipal property. The idea that we are going to take away people's houses is very frustrating. It's all lies.

So, I think that the biggest weakness is ideological, and we have to overcome it.

JRW: From your perspective, what does Twenty-First Century Socialism mean, what does is mean for the PSUV?

OG: Twenty-first century socialism is a socialism that we are building, and we have scarcely started constructing it. One hundred years could pass quickly, and we may still not have become socialists. But we are beginning to establish the foundations in the grassroots. Twenty-first century socialism is what we want, it's what all the Bolivarianos and socialists hope will occur in the future.

JRW: What is the relationship between democracy and this type of socialism? Does it mean the deepening of democracy, and, if so in what way?

OG: That's correct. The socialist democracy that we are trying to introduce is a participatory democracy, not a representative democracy. Capitalist democracy is distinctly representative. That is to say, you elect people to represent you. For us, no, we want to give power to the people, the communal councils, to the communes, so that the people really exercise power.5 Is there anything more democratic than that? It's impossible.

JRW: How has the formation of the new party, the PSUV, gone? Has it been a success? What are its strengths and its ongoing weaknesses?

OG: Obviously, it's been a success, because there is no other party that has been born with 5,700,000 members. Apart from this, the party has allowed for the popular sectors, the people of the grassroots, to participate in many of the structures that were still in the hands of people from the fourth republic.

All of the statutes of the party were discussed in assemblies of the socialist battalions. In this sense, the party has been a success.

Weaknesses? Of course, there are weaknesses. Principally, as I told you, they are ideological ones. But I think that the strengths of the PSUV are what will allow for the success of this revolution.

JRW: The last question. What kind of Venezuela are you struggling for? What type of Venezuela to you want to build?

OG: I want a Venezuela, we want a Venezuela, in which all the necessities of being a human being are covered. In which, as Bolívar said, there exists the highest level of happiness possible. That is to say, no one lacks housing, food, medical services, and satisfactory work.

And more than that, I want to go beyond that. We want a Venezuela where if you were born with a dream . . . if your dream was to be a painter, if your dream was to be a sculptor, if your dream was to be a musician, but you ended up deciding to try to become an engineer because you couldn't earn enough to live doing these other things. . . . We want a Venezuela where dreams become reality, where people live satisfactorily and satisfied, according to their dreams.

____________________________________________________

1 The Caracazo, named for the events in the capital city of Caracas in February 1989, actually involved protests and rioting against the introduction of neoliberalism across the entire country. Andrés Pérez had just been elected on an anti-neoliberal platform but was now attempting to ram an orthodox restructuring program down the throats of Venezuelans. The president decided to make an example of the protesters, and the urban poor more generally, giving the green light for military and police repression for days, leaving a large number of dead. Estimates range from 300 to 3,000 dead. The "fourth republic" is the pejorative term that Chavistas use to describe the post-1958 era of elitist "pacted democracy," or the arranged sharing of power between the ideologically indistinguishable AD and COPEI parties.

2 Most important in terms of failed counter-revolutionary measures carried out by the far-right were the April 2002 coup attempt, backed by the United States, the oil lockout of 2002-2003, and the 2004 presidential recall referendum.

3 Beginning in 2003, the Chávez administration began its mission programs, which are special programs principally in health and education that are effectively parallel structures running alongside the old ministerial and legal infrastructure of the health and education system.

4 The reform referendum included sixty-nine reforms to the 1999 Constitution that were proposed by the President and the National Assembly. The reforms were defeated in a vote on December 2, 2007 by less than 2 percent.

5 At the outset of 2007 roughly 20,000 communal councils had been formed, each consisting of between 200 and 400 families, and operating essentially as neighbourhood councils, with a budget provided by the government for infrastructural and social programs. See Steve Ellner, Rethinking Venezuelan Politics: Class, Conflict, and the Chávez Phenomenon, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008, pp 127-128.

VENEZUELA: Developments in the Cooperative Movement

Venezuela: Creating an Endogenous Cooperative Culture

Written by April Howard
Thursday, 04 September 2008

Source: http://upsidedownworld.org/main/content/view/1457/1/

Since 1998, the government of President Hugo Chavez has embarked on wide ranging projects to redistribute Venezuelan resources and services. He has promised radical change to the eighty-three percent of Venezuelans who live below the poverty line in a country that is one of the world’s largest exporters of oil.[1] Chavez has redirected oil income from a large and wealthy management to a multiplicity of projects designed to improve social welfare. The scope of these projects range from programs aimed to address health and educational needs to organic gardens, which are designed to change the modus operandi of the Venezuelan economy.

Chavez’s energy policies have also brought him just criticism from environmentalists. Though his administration has banned genetically modified seeds and created an indigenous seed bank,[2] Center on Global Prosperity director Alvaro Vargas Llosa, argues that anti-capitalist environmentalists should oppose Chavez because his "government owns scores of refineries and cashes in big time on the processing of sulfur-heavy crude."[3] Chavez’s oil contracts with Brazil’s Petrobras, and Chevron Texaco caused environmental journalist Hanna Dahlstrom to warn that Chavez' big oil projects could destroy the Amazon."[4]

Writing a Pro-Cooperative Constitution

When Chavez was elected in 1998, it was with a clear popular mandate to follow through on his promise to rewrite the constitution. During his presidency, "active participation" has been a large part of the government’s rhetoric. Article 61 from the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic states: ¨All citizens, women and men, have the right to participate freely in public affairs… the people’s participation in the formation, execution and control of public negotiation, is the necessary means to achieve the leadership that guarantees their complete development, both individual and collective..." Articles 118 and 308 declare that the state must "promote and protect" cooperatives.

CLICK HERE to continue reading and for footnotes.

New Book on Hugo Chavez Indicates Venezuela's Experiment in Participatory Democracy is Far from Over

The following book review of 'Hugo' by Bart Jones points out that once again rumours of the demise of Hugo Chavez and the 'Bolivarian Revolution' in Venezuela may be greatly exaggerated. The process of transforming Venezuela into a participatory democracy continues and the defeat of the constitutional reform package last December has not reversed that process. That poll result, which the opposition has claimed as a great victory and which the mainstream media likes to point to as the beginning of the end for Chavez, was in reality more a sign of the political empowerment and enlightenment of those who support Chavez but are not content to blindly follow him. In the grand scheme of the peaceful political revolution underway in Venezuela, it was a small speed bump in the road rather than the stop sign or the roadblock that many would like to paint it as. The fact that many of those who support the transformation underway also have a desire to proceed with caution is a reflection of their determination to see the entire process succeed. It also stems from their recognition of the danger of the elements of bureaucracy and corruption that threaten the process from within, as well as from without. Far from being a defeat for Chavez, the referendum was more a positive and encouraging sign for those who support the revolution that he initiated. It showed that the people wield true democratic power and have the wisdom to use it, and after all, that is the ultimate goal. - Editor

Forward March

Seumas Milne welcomes a timely biography of Venezuela's president

Saturday June 7, 2008
The Guardian

Source: http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2008/jun/07/biography

'Hugo'
by Bart Jones

608pp, Bodley Head, £12.99

In the decade since he was first elected president of oil-rich Venezuela as a rank outsider and exploded the country's oligarchic racket of a governing system, Hugo Chávez has become a political figure of global importance. Not only has he spearheaded a challenge to US domination and free-market dogma that has since swept across Latin America, but his "Bolivarian revolution" has also been the first real attempt since the collapse of the Soviet Union to carve out a social alternative to the neoliberal order that has been imposed across the world.

So it was no surprise when his many enemies, both at home and abroad, seized on Chávez's first rejection in a popular vote last December as an overdue sign that the upstart lieutenant colonel had finally lost his touch. The evidence from this closely researched account of Chávez's career suggests that such hopes are premature. Throughout a life that has taken him from a childhood of dirt poverty in the remote Venezuelan plains to both international acclaim and demonisation, Chávez has time and again shown an uncanny capacity not only to extricate himself from setbacks and life-threatening situations, but also to judge the right time to retreat or retrench in order to move forward later on. In the past few months, he has concentrated the government's fire on issues such as crime, corruption and milk shortages, which had eroded public confidence. With oil prices at an all-time high, Chávez's room for manoeuvre is if anything increasing, threatened only by continuing military provocations from the US-backed Colombian regime.

Such problems might seem manageable when set against Chávez's personal history of underground conspiracies, military uprisings, prison, kidnapping, counter-coups and repeated narrow escapes from death. Bart Jones effectively evokes the mesmeric grip on the imaginations of Chávez and his fellow revolutionaries of the 19th-century radical nationalist Simón Bolívar, south America's great liberation hero in the war against the Spanish empire, as well as the web of personal loyalties and betrayals that marked Chávez's painstaking construction of a secret movement aimed at overthrowing the country's established order.

But as a former AP reporter and Catholic mission worker in the Caracas slums, Jones really comes into his own in a series of gripping accounts of the violent convulsions that have punctuated Chávez's career: from the "Caracazo" massacre of over a thousand barrio dwellers and protesters against neoliberal reforms in 1989; to the military rebellion against the corrupt regime which made Chávez's name in 1992; to the abortive elite-orchestrated coup attempt against Chávez in April 2002, during which his captors argued in front of him about whether he should be killed. The extent of US backing for that coup attempt remains chilling six years later, as was the shameless celebration by US media of the assumed overthrow of an elected head of state. That visceral hostility to Venezuela's experiment in social reform and participatory democracy under Chávez remains undimmed today, reflected in current US attempts to have the country classified as a sponsor of terrorism.

Against that background, Jones's biography is a timely and compendious corrective. Broadly sympathetic without being starry-eyed, this is a journalistic rather than analytical account; but given that what happens in revolutionary Venezuela now arguably matters around the world more than at any time in its history, a book that seeks to tell the story of its architect fairly has got to be welcome.

· To order Hugo for £11.99 with free UK p&p call Guardian book service on 0870 836 0875 or go to guardian.co.uk/bookshop

Venezuela: Community Councils vs. Bureaucracy

The following piece gives an interesting assessment of the basics behind the communal councils in Venezuela and how they are creating a grassroots based system of government while at the same time providing channels by which the bureaucracy that has traditionally stifled that participatory democracy can be bypassed and rendered harmless to the process of strengthening the people's power. - Editor




Reconfiguring Democracy: Venezuela's New Communal Councils Confront Bureaucracy

From
Issue 381 - December 2007-January 2008

Source: http://www.peaceworkmagazine.org/reconfiguring-democracy-venezuelas-new-communal-councils-confront-bureaucracy

Authors: Kendra Fehrer Ponniah

Kendra Fehrer Ponniah is is a Ph.D. student in Development and Anthropology at Brown University, in Providence, RI. This article is based on research she conducted in January and December of 2006 and June of 2007, interviewing communal council members from seven communities near Barquisemeto, Venezuela.

Pro- Chávez demonstrators, September 5, 2006. Photo: Cesar Aponte

In mid-2006, several months before the presidential elections, the Venezuelan government headed by left-leaning President Hugo Chávez passed a new law. The law was called the Law on Communal Councils, and it was a cornerstone of the new political strategy to deepen democratic participation in Venezuela. As of June 2007, there were 20,000 registered communal councils across the country, plus tens of thousands more in formation. Televised speeches from the floor of the national assembly referenced the communal councils as the pivotal means of social change in Venezuela. On the tall walls of the subway stations in Caracas, gigantic red murals proclaimed the communal councils as an engine of Venezuela's transition to 21^st century socialism.

From Representative to Participatory Democracy

The communal councils are essentially neighborhood assemblies with political and fiscal powers. As described in the law, they function as neighborhood planning councils, responsible for decisions regarding infrastructure and planning-for example, where to set up the new multi-purpose sports court or what sorts of services to request for disabled youth within the community. In addition, the councils can initiate their own projects with funds obtained from the federal, state, and municipal governments and they are expected to bring together under one umbrella representatives from various community groups.

A typical communal council is made up of about 20 people, elected by a community of no more than 400 families. The geographic basis of the communal council allows members to know each other, precipitating an accountability that most representative politics fail to achieve, and furthermore ensuring that political and economic decisions made by the council are embedded in the social framework of the community.

The communal councils diverge from the typical representative democracy in one other significant way. All decisions made by the communal council can be reversed by popular vote. The vote, taken in assembly (at which 20% of all persons over 15 in the community must be present), is binding.

Community members seem to sense that this emergent form of local government is profoundly different from the previous form, in which political participation occurred once a year at the voting booth. A sentence heard over and over among community organizers is that the communal councils are transforming Venezuela into a "participatory" democracy, rather than a "representative" democracy. The communal councils provide a structure for direct democratic participation.

The potential impact of communal councils to transform the Venezuelan social and political fabric is no doubt exciting. However, like all processes of change, this one is not without challenges.

Confronting Bureaucracy

The situation faced by La Tamaca*, a neighborhood outside the city of Barquisimeto is emblematic of the challenges many community organizations face. The residents had pooled their recourses to construct a wall that would separate their community from the uninhabited land behind their homes. Together they had raised over $30,000 Bs. (10,000 USD) to complete half the wall. Once the community established a communal council, they applied for funds from the municipal government to complete the construction. The municipal government granted those funds, nearly twice what the community itself had raised, to complete the second half of the project.

The catch was, despite strong objections from the community, that the municipal government declared that it would now manage the project.

Instead of hiring workers and contractors from within the community, the municipal government hired its own contractors and suppliers. Five months later, the funds had run out, and the remaining half of the wall was only partway done.

Even with the many pro-poor initiatives over the last decade of Chávez's administration, communities are still fighting for a voice. The efforts of many, like La Tamaca, are being frustrated by the "politics as usual" attitude of many municipal and state governments. In the words of one community member: "We have a lot of public officials who are reactionaries dressed up as revolutionaries. They are more interested in their jobs than in this [revolutionary] process."

One of the purposes of the communal councils, according to a high ranking government official, is precisely to address this problem. By creating a direct link to the president and federal ministries, the communal council structure allows organized communities to bypass, or at least challenge, the clientelistic bureaucracy of municipal and state governments. Under the new law, communal councils can apply for funds directly from the Ministry of Participation and Social Development. However, some critics argue that this structure creates the danger of too much national control over grass-roots community structures.

City Council or Social Movement?

At their best, the communal councils can be used as political leverage to represent community interests at odds with the local government institutions. "Hidrolara [the public water company] is defunct," proclaimed Ismila, a community organizer in a working class neighborhood to the east of Barquisimeto. For the previous two days raw sewage had been backlogging into the streets along ten blocks of the neighborhood, including the block in front of the community health clinic. Despite numerous calls to the engineer appointed to their area, the engineer had been delaying his arrival. After he missed the appointed time for the second day in a row, five members of the communal council decided they needed to take more immediate action. They called four more colleagues from the council and caught a ride into the city center, where the Hidrolara offices were located.

At the office, they demanded to speak to the person in charge of emergency maintenance. Two hours later they left with an engineer to remedy the problem. Ismila said: "We learned today that Hidrolara is useless as an institution, it does not work for the communities. These officials think they know everything and don't listen to the community until there's a problem."

Some state and municipal institutions in Venezuela serve particular political interests, rather than the public good. When the public institutions do not fulfill their ascribed duties, the communal councils like that in Ismila's neighborhood can apply pressure. Although the council itself did not have jurisdiction over the water system, through their recognition as a communal council they have the political resources to apply political pressure to ensure the democratic distribution of water.

Not all communal councils are as politically astute as Ismila's, but a surprising number are. The community members who participate in the communal council possess a wide range of political experience, from complete novices to seasoned community organizers. Commonly, a communal council will contain five or six long-term organizers who see the communal council as simply the newest framework for emancipatory politics. It is often these more experienced organizers who are instrumental in forming the communal council.

In the case of Ismila's community, the communal council formed out of the Health Committee. The Health Committee was established several years ago, when the community was told that they were eligible to receive a Cuban doctor in the community. "There are lots of rumors that the doctors are there to hurt people, they don't have proper training, etc. We had to educate the community that this wasn't true. Thankfully, the doctor we got was very good and little by little, people stopped being afraid and came. When we heard about the communal councils law, we knew we had to get involved. Now the Health Committee is a working group of the communal council." The communal councils serve the powerful political function of coalescing a variety of community efforts.

Does Pluralism Include the Anti-Democratic?

Contrary to the perception by many of Chávez's critics, the communal councils are not composed exclusively of flag-waving Chávez supporters. In the town of El Cují, communal council member Mirabel identifies as the opposition. During the last elections, she transformed her home into a "hot corner," a common opposition protest tactic, which involves blasting anti-Chávez music onto the street and blaring sirens every 15 minutes to signify that Venezuelan democracy "is under attack." Why does she participate in the communal councils? "To keep an eye on the Chavistas," she responds, "to make sure they're not mishandling funds."

Opposition to President Chávez is located mainly, but not exclusively, in the small, active, and largely unencumbered middle and upper classes. Although some communal councils have been formed in elite neighborhoods, these do not represent the majority. The majority of communal councils are in poor and working class neighborhoods.

Still, even within poor communities, a minority do tend to identify as opposition, often because of enduring affiliation with the previously dominant parties. So, not infrequently, a communal council will have several staunch opposition members.

Despite the highly charged political rhetoric around the communal councils as a key element of the Bolivarian Process, within the actual meetings of the councils party-politics are seldom discussed. More often, topics of discussion deal with urgent community needs. Instead of playing a divisive role in the community, the communal councils appear, in some cases, to be fulfilling a reconciliatory role. Through regular interaction in meetings, often accompanied by socializing outside formal gatherings, the communal councils are becoming a space for breaking down political barriers.

Although pluralism is a central tenet of a democratic society, when some of those diverse constituents are actively anti-democratic the situation becomes a bit more complex.

While the minority opposition represents its position as one of advocating for democratic rights, the democracy for which the opposition advocates is essentially a liberal democracy, bent on the protection of private property and individual rights. It is precisely this form of democracy that has prevailed in Venezuela historically, and which the current government is trying to transform. The model proposed by the opposition conflicts with Venezuela's emergent radicalized democracy, which seeks to expand collective rights and responsibilities. For example, the constitutional reforms rejected in a referendum on December 2, 2007 included language to create three new types of collective property.

Why do political frameworks matter to the communal council? Although opposition and pro- Chávez residents can agree on addressing urgent community needs, the types of solutions offered to neighborhood problems could be vastly different. A liberal democratic model is not incompatible with the neoliberal framework that dominated the country for the last decades. Under this model, a communal council could offer micro-credit for individual businesses, without precipitating any shift in consciousness towards new notions of collective responsibility and social development.

One project I observed did just that. An organizer from another council explained, "The communal council gave out loans for everything, to start a phone stand, to buy motorcycles to use for ëmoto-taxis', to start hair salons… there was a lot of individual profit, but not a lot of community benefit." In contrast, a reconfigured democratic model would value not only the material benefits to the individual, but how the collective would benefit, both materially and in terms of participation.

The communal councils do not have an easy task. They face the challenge of maintaining political pluralism, challenging entrenched political and economic interests, and responding to the demands of a population whose basic needs have been ignored for decades. As one long-time activist said with both optimism and concern, "The communal councils are our primary hope for the long-term success of the revolution. They have the potential to change the very fabric of this country."

From Issue 381 - December 2007-January 2008

The Media Campaign Against Venezuela's Participatory Democracy

The following two articles both attempt to dispel the disinformation in the mainstream media regarding Venezuela, but from differing perspectives. The first comes from a professional journalist and attacks the mainstream media demanding that the truth about Venezuela's thriving democracy and economic redistribution be reported upon accurately. The second is a report from the Venezuela Solidarity Network of Australia, and is based upon the personal experiences of Sydney residents recently returned from a delegation to Venezuela. This article helps to back up the first with some more first hand evidence from the grassroots. Revealing the truth through public and diverse media as well as connecting people through face-to-face delegations will help to promote participatory democracy by exposing the benefits it brings to society in Venezuela and all around the globe. -Editor

Johann Hari: Lies, kidnapping and a mysterious laptop

You have been told that the Venezuelan President supports the Farc thugs

Monday, 7 July 2008

Source: http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/johann-hari/johann-hari-lies-kidnapping-and-a-mysterious-laptop-861286.html

Sometimes you hear a stray sentence on the news that makes you realise you have been lied to. Deliberately lied to; systematically lied to; lied to for a purpose. If you listened closely over the past few days, you could have heard one such sentence passing in the night-time of news.

As Ingrid Betancourt emerged after six-and-a-half years – sunken and shrivelled but radiant with courage – one of the first people she thanked was Hugo Chavez. What? If you follow the news coverage, you have been told that the Venezuelan President supports the Farc thugs who have been holding her hostage. He paid them $300m to keep killing and to buy uranium for a dirty bomb, in a rare break from dismantling democracy at home and dealing drugs. So how can this moment of dissonance be explained?

Yes: you have been lied to – about one of the most exciting and original experiments in economic redistribution and direct democracy anywhere on earth. And the reason is crude: crude oil. The ability of democracy and freedom to spread to poor countries may depend on whether we can unscramble these propaganda fictions.

Venezuela sits on one of the biggest pools of oil left anywhere. If you find yourself in this position, the rich governments of the world – the US and EU – ask one thing of you: pump the petrol and the profits our way, using our corporations. If you do that, we will whisk you up the Mall in a golden carriage, no matter what. The "King" of Saudi Arabia oversees a torturing tyranny where half the population – women – are placed under house arrest, and jihadis are pumped out by the dozen to attack us. It doesn't matter. He gives us the oil, so we hold his hand and whisper sweet crude-nothings in his ear.

It has always been the same with Venezuela – until now. Back in 1908, the US government set up its ideal Venezuelan regime: a dictator who handed the oil over fast and so freely that he didn't even bother to keep receipts, never mind ask for a cut. But in 1998 the Venezuelan people finally said "enough". They elected Hugo Chavez. The President followed their democratic demands: he increased the share of oil profits taken by the state from a pitiful one per cent to 33 per cent. He used the money to build hospitals and schools and subsidised supermarkets in the tin-and-mud shanty towns where he grew up, and where most of his countrymen still live.

I can take you to any random barrio in the high hills that ring Caracas and show you the results. You will meet women like Francisca Moreno, a gap-toothed 76-year-old granny I found sitting in a tin shack, at the end of a long path across the mud made out of broken wooden planks. From her doorway she looked down on the shining white marble of Caracas's rich district. "I went blind 15 years ago because of cataracts," she explained, and in the old Venezuela people like her didn't see doctors. "I am poor," she said, "so that was that." But she voted for Chavez. A free clinic appeared two years later in her barrio, and she was taken soon after for an operation that restored her sight. "Once I was blind, but now I see!" she said, laughing.

In 2003, two distinguished Wall Street consulting firms conducted the most detailed study so far of economic change under Chavez. They found that the poorest half of the country have seen their incomes soar by 130 per cent after inflation. Today, there are 19,571 primary care doctors – an increase by a factor of 10. When Chavez came to power, just 35 per cent of Venezuelans told Latinobarometro, the Gallup of Latin America, they were happy with how their democracy worked. Today it is 59 per cent, the second-highest in the hemisphere.

For the rich world's governments – and especially for the oil companies, who pay for their political campaigns – this throws up a serious problem. We are addicted to oil. We need it. We crave it. And we want it on our terms. The last time I saw Chavez, he told me he would like to sell oil differently in the future: while poor countries should get it for $10 a barrel, rich countries should pay much more – perhaps towards $200. And he has said that if the rich countries keep intimidating the rest he will shift to selling to China instead. Start the sweating. But Western governments cannot simply say: "We want the oil, our corporations need the profits, so let's smash the elected leaders standing in our way." They know ordinary Americans and Europeans would gag.

So they had to invent lies. They come in waves, each one swelling as the last crashes into incredulity. First they announced Chavez was a dictator. This ignored that he came to power in a totally free and open election, the Venezuelan press remains uncensored and in total opposition to him, and he has just accepted losing a referendum to extend his term and will stand down in 2013.

When that tactic failed, the oil industry and the politicians they lubricate shifted strategy. They announced that Chavez was a supporter of Terrorism (it definitely has a capital T). The Farc is a Colombian guerrilla group that started in the 1960s as a peasant defence network, but soon the pigs began to look like farmers and they became a foul, kidnapping mafia. Where is the evidence Chavez funded them?

On 1 March, the Colombian government invaded Ecuador and blew up a Farc training camp. A few hours later, it announced it had found a pristine laptop in the rubble, and had already rummaged through the 39.5 million pages of Microsoft Word documents it contained to find cast-iron "proof" that Chavez was backing the Farc. Ingrid's sister, Astrid Betancourt, says it is plainly fake. The camp had been totally burned to pieces and the computers had clearly, she says, been "in the hands of the Colombian government for a very long time". Far from fuelling the guerrillas, Chavez has repeatedly pleaded with the Farc to disarm. He managed to negotiate the release of two high-profile hostages – hence Betancourt's swift thanks. He said: "The time of guns has passed. Guerilla warfare is history."

So what now? Now they claim he is a drug dealer, he funds Hezbollah, he is insane. Sometimes they even stumble on some of the real non-fiction reasons to criticise Chavez and use them as propaganda tools. (See our Open House blog later today for a discussion of this). As the world's oil supplies dry up, the desire to control Venezuela's pools will only increase. The US government is already funding separatist movements in Zulia province, along the border with Colombia, where Venezuela's largest oilfields lie. They hope they can break away this whiter-skinned, anti-Chavez province and then drink deep of the petrol there.

Until we break our addiction to oil, our governments will always try to snatch petro-profits away from women like Francisca Moreno. And we – oil addicts all – will be tempted to ignore the strange, dissonant sentences we sometimes hear on the news and lie, blissed-out, in the lies.

j.hari@independent.co.uk

Inspiration from Venezuela 'brigadistas'

Source: http://www.greenleft.org.au/2008/757/39115

Lisa Macdonald, Sydney
5 July 2008

Three of the five Sydney residents who joined a May Day solidarity brigade to Venezuela reported back on their observations and experiences of the Bolivarian revolution to a meeting of 35 people on June 24.

Margaret Allum explained that the brigade of 12 Australians, organised by the Australia-Venezuela Solidarity Network (AVSN), was very warmly received by the many organisations and people they met in Venezuela. She described the massive “sea of red” at the May Day rally in Caracas, which the brigadistas joined with a large Australian solidarity banner.

She also reported on the inspiring discussions with the workers at SIDOR, Venezuela’s largest steelmaking company, which was nationalised on April 9 after a long struggle by workers.

A major focus of the brigade — which included members of the Electrical Trades Union, NSW Teachers Federation (NSWTF), Community and Public Sector Union, Maritime Union of Australia and the National Tertiary Education Union — was to learn about workers’ rights and workers’ control in Venezuela.

NSWTF member Phil Bradley described the revolution’s remarkable achievements in the area of education, contrasting this with the massive de-funding of public education in NSW and nationally, and the erosion of Australian teachers’ working conditions.

Will Silk discussed the Venezuelan revolution’s commitment to participatory democracy, fostered through the social missions, the communal councils and experiments in endogenous development. He stressed the global significance of the Venezuelans’ attempts to create a new form of socialism — a socialism of the 21st century — and the many challenges still to be overcome if the revolution is to succeed.

The brigadistas welcome invitations to speak about their experiences to any organisation interested in hearing more. They can be contacted at . The AVSN’s next brigade to Venezuela will be held on November 20-30. For more information, visit http://www.venezuelasolidarity.org.

People's Power in Venezuela: Communal Councils Advance in Libertador

As always we keep a close eye on the building of participatory democracy in Venezuela. The article below gives an account of the progress made in the municipality of Libertador, some of the challenges faced by communal councils, and the national policies regarding participatory democracy. Following the article, find a link to an audio clip of a program that covers the Venezuela Solidarity Symposium that took place in Washington DC in April. Activists and Venezuelan leaders united at the conference and shared important information and analysis of the Bolivarian Revolution, US-Venezuelan relations, and most importantly, participatory democracy on the streets and in the workplace. If time is limited, skip the first 10 minutes of the program. - Editor

People's Power in Venezuela

by John Riddell
January 10, 2008

Source: http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=45&ItemID=14695

"If we want to talk of socialism," says Argenis Loreto, "we must first resolve the people's most urgent needs: water in their homes, accessible health care, easy access to housing."

In the Venezuelan municipality of Libertador (state of Carabobo), of which Argenis is mayor, "we have 90% poverty. Ending that is our first task. I am convinced that the existing state cannot do this." It's essential that "the majority of the people become part of the decision-making process."

But when Argenis was elected in 2000, the second year of the Bolivarian government headed by president Hugo Chávez, he found that "the people did not possess the tools needed for their participation."

That insight led Chávez and the Bolivarian government to initiate the formation of neighbourhood councils across the country—councils that they view as the embryo of a new people's state.

Suzanne Weiss and I spent two days in Libertador, one of the first municipalities where such councils were formed, talking to Argenis and dozens of others. This report is based on what we saw; it also draws on Marta Harnecker's outstanding study of the Libertador experience.*

A devastated community

With 200,000 residents, Libertador sprawls across a mainly rural territory the size of Metro Toronto (20 km. x 30 km.). Most of its employed population works in nearby Valencia, the country's heartland of privately owned industry. Jouncing over its ruined roads in the back of a pickup, we saw a district that had been devastated not by natural catastrophe but by a social calamity— decades of systematic neglect.

"Before we had many problems," recalls Félix Hernández, member of a community government. "The roads were super-awful. The electricity worked one or two days and then shut off. Health service was chaotic. Water service was complete chaos."

Appealing to city hall was a waste of time. "It was horrendous," says another council member, Virginia Diaz. "We'd go with petitions and explain. They'd visit and approve the project." But nothing would happen. "When we went back to the office, they'd never heard of us, didn't know anything…. As useful as tits on a bull."

The result was public apathy, says municipal social activist Fidel Hernández—like Argenis, a published poet. "The people had let itself be convinced that it could not govern. There was a deliberate policy for this … that's why we had 1½ million who were illiterate."

Tools for people's power

Of peasant origins, Argenis Loreto finished only six years of schooling before starting his working life in factories, industrial management, farming, and again in factories. He joined a revolutionary group at age 17, took part in the Bolivarian movement's unsuccessful coup in 1992 and became mayor after two decades of underground activity.

Convinced that only the poor and disenfranchised could reconstruct his municipality—and his nation—he sought to bridge the gulf between them and the instruments of government. Argenis and his colleagues set out to do this by extending governmental structures to the community level and by delegating power to community governments. Such a shift was authorized by a decentralization clause (Article 184) in the Bolivarian constitution adopted in 1999.

Progress was slow at first. The right-wing coup and bosses' strike of 2002-2003 delayed restructuring. The Libertador plan ran into strong opposition from some Bolivarian national legislators, who accused Argenis of "creating illegal associations."

Finally, in 2006, the community structure was in place: 35 "social territories," which united residents that shared similar problems, a common project, and a sense of belonging to a common environment. They ranged in size from 1,000 to 15,000 residents. Each territory elected a government through assemblies of its residents, usually choosing between competing slates of candidates. All community government work is voluntary—no salaries are paid—but relevant expenses are reimbursed.

In one of the social territories, skeptical residents declined to name a council. In another, a centre of Libertador's small middle class, the opposition slate was elected. "Many right-wing oppositionists join in community council activity," says Argenis. "They feel they cannot stand aside from the social programs and local projects that the councils carry out…. The opposition's role in local government has helped ease political tensions here."

The people's power structure has two tiers. Each social territory or commune includes smaller and more homogenous communities, each of which has its own communal council. The size of component communities is determined by social geography: urban councils typically unite 200-400 families; rural councils, 20-50 families. The smallest social territory by population (Mont Vernont), is composed of dispersed mountain hamlets: it therefore includes the largest number of communities. In Libertador, there are 204 such communal councils.

Participatory budget

Each communal council and social territory holds assemblies to choose and prioritize its ten most needed projects for the coming year. The municipal planning council then evaluates the top three proposals from each territory—more than three, if finances permit. A value of 1 to 9 is assigned to each of a number of criteria: number of residents, number who will benefit, cost, how long the request has been pending, the number of previous projects in this community, etc.

This ranking creates a proposed project list that is presented to an assembly in each territory, which can change its priorities and request reconsideration—if for example a favored project turned out to be impossibly expensive.

Once the project list is decided, the required funds are allocated to the community bodies, which handle administration, buy materials, and engage workers or contractors, giving preference to cooperatives. Community networking and know-how helps keep costs down, and any savings stay in the community for other purposes. Argenis estimates that $1 million a year is saved simply by eliminating private profits.

"For example, a flood control project was approved with a budget of 184 million bolivars [about $90,000]," says Fidel Hernández. "But in fact the community councils did it for 47 million and had lots left over for fixing roads.

"In another case, the local council got a price of 80 million to bring electricity to a district. But in fact they managed to do three districts for that price.

"Last year the community councils spent 84% of the municipal budget [for projects]," Fidel notes.

Accomplishments

Popular control has steered funding toward small, plain, and inexpensive projects densely spread through local neighborhoods. Urgent human needs have taken priority over infrastructure requirements like road upgrades.

Argenis highlights the 74 primary-care health centres built by neighborhood councils, which at first sometimes even manufactured the bricks. "We had only nine centres before," he says. In addition, Libertador boasts four Integral Diagnostic Centres—small hospitals—"the pride of our community," according to Felix Hernández.. Another community government member, Aixa Silvera, calls the Cuban doctors working in these centres "the most spectacular thing we have in the communities.

Indeed, Libertador led the way in Venezuela by arranging for Cuban doctors to work in the communities, before this became a national program.

Argenis says that community governments are building 48 primary schools this year—mostly one-room structures serving a neighborhood. There are also now three university campuses in Libertador—part of a national program to "municipalize higher education."

"As for sports, there are now only two or three communities that do not have a minimal installation" which means a playing field.

The citizens of Libertador are also trying to establish cultural centres in each social territory, usually an "open-air amphitheatre." Eight cultural centres are now under construction In some cases resident assemblies gave building a cultural centre priority over fixing the road or installing street lighting. "You can't have a revolution without beauty," Fidel Hernández says.

The obvious progress is confirmed by two surveys that were taken at the beginning of the community government program and again in May 2007. The first survey showed that the most urgently felt needs were for health care and educational facilities. In the second, no one cited health care as a concern, and almost no one mentioned education. Moreover, "we now have hardly any kids on the streets," says Argenis, "and the problem of homelessness is almost solved."

The Housing Bottleneck

According to official estimates, Venezuela has a shortage of 2.7 million homes, while another 1.3 million dwellings are inadequate home-made shacks. In 2006, 200,000 homes were built—a positive achievement, but far less than what is needed.

Argenis believes that community councils, who feel this urgent need acutely, are best suited to build houses. Sometimes they "build 10, 12, even 15 houses with the money provided for seven," he says.

"But we desperately need raw materials. Our economy was destroyed, and now we don't have the capacity to make the cement blocks, the paint, the ceramic toilets. We're working with Iran, China, and Brazil to meet these needs."

And Venezuela is building six factories to produce plastic building materials—"we have oil, after all," says Argenis. This project, called Petrocasa, will supply materials for 15,000 new houses a year. One of these factories, is close by, in the state of Carabobo.

National expansion

In 2006 Hugo Chávez endorsed the establishment of communal councils as a priority across Venezuela. In January 2007, he declared them institutions of "people's power," an embryo of a new people's state. An enabling law was passed in April, and there are now more than 10,000 councils across the country.

While vindicating the innovative program in Libertador, this expansion also caused the municipality many headaches. The national government intended the councils to be free of the deadening hand of the traditional state bureaucracy. Among other things, word went out that mayors should not get involved with these people's organizations. This directive might be appropriate in the nearby industrial city of Valencia, ruled by the opposition, but in Libertador it was totally at odds with reality.

Unfortunately, the Carabobo state government, led by critics of Argenis's initiatives, seized on this opening to create problems for Libertador's government. Utilizing its own statewide network of paid social activists, it promoted the notion that communal councils don't need to work with Libertador's larger social territories or with the city government.

"That caused a terrible process of fragmentation and division between the two levels of popular power," says Argenis.

Much effort has gone into knitting the two levels of people's government back together, Argenis says. "When they work together they're unbeatable."

People's power was an element of the constitution reform narrowly defeated in the December 2, 2007, referendum. The communal councils are still authorized under Article 184 of the constitution and the April 2006 legislation, and there is no legal barrier to expanding the structures beyond this framework. However, the referendum setback may encourage the councils' critics.

Bureaucratic obstruction

The community government bodies in Libertador aren't perfect. Among the occasional abuses noted by Argenis:

· Only one community is represented in a social territory council.
· One slate takes all the leadership positions.
· Elected officers take decisions on their own without convening the residents' assembly.
· The assembly functions poorly because of lack of interest.

These can be viewed as growing pains. As community government officer Omaira Carvallo comments, "When people see what is accomplished, it will break through their apathy."

More troubling is the conduct of other branches of government, such as the problems with Carabobo State. Among the many stories of this sort that Argenis tells, the pig manure episode is enough to illustrate what people's power is up against.

The city government makes special efforts to help Libertador's many farmers, a number of whom raise pigs. Some time ago the Ministry of the Environment banned hog-raising in the municipality because of concerns for water quality, but did not enforce the regulation. Libertador tried to help farmers solve the water problem on their own, by providing septic tanks for environmentally safe treatment of pig manure. The manure's polluting gas discharge was captured and burned for cooking. "This is a miracle," says Argenis. "It cuts out the smell and uses the gas!"

But the ministry intervened and nixed the project, which they said broke their rule against raising pigs. The bureaucratic method could not be better demonstrated: only the formal regulation counted; the real-life problem of manure pollution was of no interest.

What explanations do the ministry provide? "None whatsoever," says Argenis. "Just as we always say: this bureaucracy is eating us alive… We can't change things with this type of state."

Even among inherited municipal officials, "the apathy is barbaric. We have to establish a new conception of a staffer," Argenis says. "I'd like to dissolve the municipal administration … and create a confederation of community governments."

Reflections

At first glance, Venezuela's people's power can seem to be just a formal structure—municipal government on a street level. This is misleading. The councils have appeared and made gains only as part of an immense popular movement on a national level: the Bolivarian revolution.

This revolution was born in the mass mobilizations against the U.S.-backed oligarchy's attempts to overthrow the country's elected government—by a military coup in 2002, by an economic shutdown in 2003, and by an anti-Chavez referendum in 2004. All were defeated by the initiatives of masses of working people.

In Libertador, Argenis recalls, the embryonic community governments acted as defense committees, struggling to ensure that food, cooking gas, and gasoline reached the people. "That was just so wonderful," he says. "Quickly we had a network of more than 200 Bolivarian shops," distributing necessities and helping defend the revolution. Such national struggles were the true birth of people's power.

Venezuela's success at forging constructive ties with other non-imperialist states has also played a role, not just through Cuba's contribution to health services, but above all in building alliances to help fend off, for now, a U.S.-led assault.

The sometimes destructive role of national and state authorities is also a reminder that the power of working people will not flourish at the street level unless it is consolidated nationally.

Yet the community councils in Libertador call us to us, Sí se puede! – Yes we can do it! Enlisting the majority, the working people, in government is indeed possible. Venezuela's people's power—while still embryonic—is a living, viable reality.

John Riddell is co-editor of Socialist Voice

https://mail.zmag.org/exchweb/bin/redir.asp?URL=http://www.socialistvoice.ca).

* Marta Harnecker, Gobierenos Comunitarios: Transformando el Estado desde abajo. [Community governments: transforming the state from below] Monte Avila Editores, 2007. This book is not readily available outside Venezuela. However, its text is available online. Harnecker is director of the "Popular Participation in Public Management" program of the Central Internacional Miranda, a Bolivarian research institute in Caracas.

Audio program from Venezuela Solidarity Symposium: http://calamadison.org/dasa/